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**INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
TO MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBAN TERRAIN:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BATTLE OF GROZNY**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRIAN A. KELLER
United States Army**

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Brian A. Keller
United States Army

Dr. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr.
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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This paper is an analysis of the current United States Army's intelligence capabilities to support military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT). It begins with an in depth discussion of the topic's relevance to Army warfighters. Next, the paper provides an overview of the 1994-1995 Russian Battle of Grozny as a case study for lessons learned especially focused toward intelligence operations. Finally, an analysis of these lessons learned serves as a basis for recommending how we can better leverage Army intelligence doctrine, organizations, and materiel to support tactical forces fighting in a MOUT environment.

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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBAN TERRAIN: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BATTLE OF GROZNY

The pale light of Russian flares or burning buildings revealed ghostly figures of [Chechen] fighters in white smocks and green Islamic headbands; obscure piles of branches disguised a machine-gun post, its ammunition belt glinting against the snow; barricaded into the upper floors of apartment buildings, ambushers waited with their RPGs for the Russian armour to roll into the wide streets below.

—Sebastian Smith¹

The steady staccato of Chechen machine gun fire filled the cold night air, silenced only by the thud of Russian artillery raining down on the city of Grozny each hour New Years Eve, 1994. Nearby, orange flames from burning oil refineries provided a surrealistic setting for the red tracers ricocheting across the sky. Into the evening, long columns of Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers (APC) slowly snaked their way through darkened streets, often halting in flames as volleys of rocket propelled grenades (RPG) found their lead and trail elements. Russian infantrymen tucked inside their APCs refused to dismount into the small arms crossfire outside—only to be incinerated as their vehicles caught fire. In the chaotic cauldron swirling about them, tank crews and other stragglers became lost, surrounded, and separated from their comrades. Those not captured quickly fell prey to Chechen snipers—or were hunted down by Chechens armed with swords, knives, and pistols.

Just hours before, young Russian conscripts like Sergei, an armored vehicle mechanic with the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) destined to lead the attack into Grozny, gathered around their leaders for their first briefing on the upcoming mission. Told there would be no fighting and that their threat consisted of “armed criminals,” Sergei and his leaders hastily headed off toward their objective—the Presidential Palace located in central Grozny. Less than twenty-four hours later, Sergei, now wounded, found himself a prisoner of the Chechens—with more than half of his one thousand-man regiment killed, wounded, or captured.² The 131st “Maikop” Motorized Rifle Brigade (MRB) attacking the same night suffered even greater losses: 20 out of 26 tanks and 102 out of 120 APCs. Hundreds more from other units also lie dead.

Their first attacks repulsed, the Russians regrouped, initiating a “Stalingrad-like” offensive eventually ejecting the Chechen defenders by 26 February 1995. Yet, on 13 August 1996 the Chechens, now known by their foes as *boyeviks*—or “warriors” in Russian—regained control of Grozny killing over four hundred Russians in a weeklong battle. That same week negotiators led by Kremlin Security Council secretary Alexander Lebed brokered a cease-fire agreement. On 23 November, weary of a war gone awry, President Boris Yeltsin ordered the withdrawal of all Russian troops from Chechnya. Unfortunately for the Russian President, the ghost of Grozny continues to haunt his soldiers: at the time of this writing, Russian troops stand poised once again for another Battle for Grozny.

This paper is an analysis of the current United States Army's intelligence capabilities to support successful combat operations on urbanized terrain. It begins with a discussion of the topic's relevance to Army Warfighters. Next, the paper provides an overview of the Battle of Grozny as a case study focused on intelligence operations. Finally, an analysis of lessons learned serves as the basis for recommending how we can better leverage Army intelligence doctrine, organizations, and materiel to support tactical forces fighting in a Military Operation on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) environment.

What, then, makes intelligence support to Warfighters in a MOUT environment a relevant topic today?

A RELEVANT TOPIC FOR TODAY'S WARFIGHTERS

Three interrelated factors converging today demand a greater investment in reengineering intelligence support to MOUT. First, recent trends toward global urbanization combined with the lack of a military peer competitor until 2025 suggest the increasing irrelevance of non-urban terrain in the geo-strategic landscape. Second, this changing environment creates new operating challenges for our fighting forces, especially in the way we use and think about intelligence. Finally, our current intelligence doctrine, materiel, and organizations appear inadequate to meet these challenges. We discuss each of these three factors in greater detail below.

GLOBAL URBANIZATION TRENDS AND THE INCREASING IRRELEVANCE OF NON-URBAN TERRAIN

As America enters the Twenty First Century, global urbanization continues at unprecedented rates. Currently, developing countries worldwide increase their urban populations by about 150,000 people each day.³ Moreover, according to United Nations forecasts, by the year 2025, the number of people living in urban areas will double to more than five billion—between 60 to 80 percent of the world's population. More astonishingly, nearly 90 percent of this growth will occur in developing countries.⁴ As Table 1 below indicates, the trend toward "million-people cities" and "megacities" since 1950 also continues to rise. Not surprisingly, population experts estimate that by the early part of the next century, 80 percent of nation-state capitals will include populations over one million people, with 85 percent of the world's population living in the littorals by 2015.⁵

	1950	1990	2015
"MILLION CITIES" [pop. >1 million]	50	270	516
"MEGACITIES" [pop. >8 million]	Worldwide: 2 Developing World: 0	Worldwide: 21 Developing World: 16	Worldwide: 33 Developing World: 27

TABLE 1, POPULATION TRENDS IN LARGE CITIES⁶

What implications for U. S. Army operations can we discern from these trends in global urbanization? Some, like U. S. Army War College Commandant Major General Robert H. Scales,

suggest that

Urban warfare doesn't happen all that often. Both sides realize the destructive effects that street fighting may cause. Only a desperate enemy, defending at great disadvantage, willing to sacrifice initiatives, his cities, and a large portion of his military force, has taken to defending cities. A casual glance at the last 500 years of major war history shows that as more of the world blankets itself in urban sprawl, the incidents of actual street fighting have declined.⁷

Yet, as the United States moves away from a strategy of containment to one of collective engagement that shapes the international environment, responds to a full spectrum of crises, and prepares for an uncertain future, operations in urban areas may simply become unavoidable. Recent U. S. military operations including Panama City in 1989, Mogadishu in 1992-1993, and Port-au-Prince in 1994 provide three examples. Today, cities remain focal points or centers of gravity for military operations ranging from small-scale contingencies to major theater wars. Explaining the significance of cities to military operations in the future, Army After Next Urban Warfare Project Director Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hahn offers this view:

Unfortunately, if demographers and political strategists are correct, the reality is that many, if not most, of the military operations of the next two decades will be conducted in and around large urban areas. Cities—and those connected to clusters of cities called “conurbations”—increasingly will be the political, economical, social, and cultural epicenters around the world. The control of large urban areas will be critical to the successful accomplishment of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in future conflicts.⁸

Based on this analysis, cities will remain important objectives for military planners. Three reasons help explain this development.

First, cities often contain vital communications and transportation hubs including airfields and ports. They normally house the production capabilities, industry, and wealth of developing nations, and, more than likely, hold the seats of national and local government. Cities may also sit astride major lines of operations between two natural obstacles, blocking a maneuvering army's approach toward enemy forces. As such, control of cities either by adversaries threatening U. S. military or humanitarian operations, or by forces unfriendly to the host nation, may provide unacceptable risks to securing U. S. national interests. As urban warfare expert William G. Rosenau observes:

Cities, particularly capital cities, are the locus of economic, political, and social power, and are becoming more so. It is not surprising, then, that cities serve as critical arenas for those fighting to preserve national, ethnic, or religious identity. Put another way, urban areas are the key battlegrounds in any significant defense of the homeland.⁹

As we shall examine later, such is the case for the city of Grozny and the Chechens.

Next, armies sent to developing nations will be drawn to cities based on “the fundamental need to control indigenous populations—which cannot be done without mastering their urban centers.”¹⁰ French counterinsurgency expert Roger Trinquier, writing over twenty years ago, reinforced this point: “It is

accepted as fact the final stake of *modern warfare* is the control of the population. The army should therefore make its main effort in those areas where the population is densest; that is, in the cities.”¹¹ Again, control of major cities underscored initial military objectives during operations in Panama, Somalia and Haiti. During Operations *Just Cause* and *Restore Democracy*, rapid control of the *capital* cities became the prerequisite for subsequent successful military operations and, more importantly, securing strategic endstates.

Finally, urban areas may become the battleground of choice for adversaries who face overwhelming U. S. military capabilities. Indeed, learning and adaptive future foes will employ asymmetrical means to offset our advantages in firepower, maneuver, and unprecedented command, control, communications, and intelligence systems well suited for open terrain. Occupying urban areas offers such a means. Unwilling to meet U. S. military forces in open combat, potential enemies may choose instead to wear down our national will by presenting the American people with the specter of urban conflict. Recall the effects on the American public—and their President—of television broadcasts showing dead Army Rangers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu on 4 October 1993. Images of beheaded Russian soldiers in Chechnya—and prisoners hanging upside-down from high-rise buildings to thwart attacks—had similar effects on Russian popular opinion. Presented with a protracted house to house, block to block battle of attrition, American support could quickly dissipate. Thus, as Rosenau again succinctly states, “Aware of our increasing unwillingness to take casualties or cause collateral damage, and understanding our lack of comparative advantage in the urban environment, U. S. adversaries are increasingly likely to engage our forces in cities.”¹²

Given these trends in global urbanization and the necessity of operating in cities, what challenges will American fighters face in this unforgiving environment?

THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT AND NEW OPERATING CHALLENGES

The trend towards urbanization and the corresponding importance of urban areas presents unique challenges for commanders and soldiers, and their intelligence team. Intelligence analysts and operators—as well as all leaders—must recognize these differences to effectively and efficiently operate in cities. Several factors illustrate this point.

To begin with, city geography creates significant physical and dimensional differences compared to traditional “open terrain” maneuver warfare. Besides natural terrain features present within the city, extraordinary combinations of high-rise buildings, a wide variety of construction materials, subterranean sewer systems and subways, and extensive highway and road networks characterize the urban battlefield. Unprecedented spatial differences occur as soldiers emerge from darkened subways to confront foes defending from high-rise apartment complexes. Typical city terrain, already highly restrictive by its nature, also compartmentalizes operations, blocks communications, limits observation and fields of fire, mitigates weapons effectiveness, hinders mobility, and reduces leaders’ span of control. Moreover, “unique to MOUT is the phenomenon that the conduct of operations can radically alter the

physical nature of the terrain in ways and to an extent not experienced in other environments. Some buildings suffer damage, with collapsed walls or roofs, while others are razed completely, leaving only a pile of rubble.¹³ As retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper adds, taken together, "these factors tend to force extremely close combat with troops fighting from building to building and from room to room."¹⁴

Modern day Grozny exemplifies many of the above characteristics. A city with many multiple-story buildings containing 490,000 residents by 1994, Grozny originally grew into a large industrial metropolis as an oil-producing city in the 1920s. Author Anatol Lieven, visiting the city before the war, provided this description: "Grozny, like most southern Russian and Caucasian cities, is a sprawling place, with huge suburbs of one-story houses, and enormous industrial areas, altogether covering more than a hundred square miles."¹⁵ Returning after the February 1995 battle, he provided this stark contrast:

The really gross destruction of buildings was limited to an area of some five square miles of the city centre, where the main battles of January–February 1995 were concentrated. . . . One broad finger of ruins extended from the north . . . where the Russians fought their way in from one side; another ran west to the railway station; a third extended south-eastwards . . . where the Russians advanced outwards in February 1995. Along this street, every building was destroyed.

The whole centre around the presidential headquarters was also one field of jagged ruins. . . . In this area, the destruction was fully comparable to pictures of Stalingrad in 1943, Berlin in 1945, or Hue in 1968. Elsewhere, in the sprawling suburbs that extend on all sides of the city, the destruction was more sporadic. But all over the city I found here and there in the courtyards of apartment blocks, in ones and twos and fours, fresh graves of the people who had been killed or—if old and sick—had simply died of cold, hunger and exhaustion in the cellars where they were hiding.¹⁶

Beyond physical differences, noncombatants add still another challenge to urban fighting. Here, careful consideration to balancing socio-political concerns with military operations becomes a vital task for U. S. commanders. Preventing food and water shortages, mitigating the effects of disease and epidemics, maintaining uninterrupted operation of minimal essential services, and managing relief efforts complicate urban operations. At the same time, Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), refugees, neutrals, international aid organization, foreign diplomats, the urban elite, and criminal elements—not to mention the enemy—all have different and not necessarily complimentary agendas. The presence of these different categories of noncombatants can present commanders with a scenario described by General Charles Krulak as the "three block war." While one friendly force engages the enemy in fierce fighting, a second force could simultaneously execute peace enforcement operations, with a third force providing humanitarian assistance in another city section.

Transitioning from one "block" to the next becomes exceedingly difficult, especially given the challenges of distinguishing between noncombatant, friend, or foe in a crowded, chaotic, close combat environment. All too often, the nature of urban combat places noncombatants in close proximity to the fighting. Regardless, criteria for successful urban operations will likely include not only military mission accomplishment with reasonable friendly casualties, but *tolerable noncombatant casualties* as well.¹⁷

Unfortunately, enemies who use women and children as shields while firing at American soldiers (as in Somalia) or place hostages within prepared positions (as in Grozny) greatly complicate this task.

Besides the increasing relevance of urban terrain generated by global urbanization and the complex characteristics of urban environments, current doctrine offers a third reason to study intelligence support to MOUT. Indeed, the changing nature of warfare, as Lieutenant General Van Riper reminds us, "requires new ways of thinking about operations in cities, as well as the exploration of new technologies to facilitate the conduct of maneuver warfare in urban conditions."¹⁸ Doctrine provides the basis for these changes. How, then, does our existing doctrine measure up to the task?

THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT DOCTRINE REGARDING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO MOUT

Joint doctrine provides the foundation for service doctrine and supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures. Describing the role of doctrine, the authors of Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* write: "Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. It provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience with warfare."¹⁹ Moreover, "joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how to best employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends. As such, it represents authoritative guidance for the joint employment of the Armed Forces."²⁰

Just as importantly, joint doctrine influences training, leader development, materiel, organizations, systems acquisition, technology, and research and development. As a recent RAND study on MOUT doctrine concludes, "without doctrine to provide a beacon, these activities can occur in haphazard, inefficient, uncoordinated, and possibly ineffective ways. Training in particular relies on doctrine for uniform standards and consistency in method in the organizations for which the doctrine was written. Lacking this guidance, [Combatant Commander in Chiefs] will receive units that have incompatible approaches to MOUT."²¹ The same RAND report contains two significant conclusions: first, there exists today a doctrinal void in joint MOUT doctrine; and second, existing service doctrine remains woefully inadequate to meet current operational requirements. An earlier 1994 Defense Science Board report provides a more sobering assessment of MOUT doctrine: "Our forces lack the specific doctrine, equipment, and support required to conduct urban operations with excellence."²²

Despite these admonishments, it was not until mid-October 1998 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff J8 22nd Joint Doctrine Working Party decided to develop a separate joint MOUT publication.²³ In fact, only days before the services finally agreed on the same need. Although acknowledging the requirement for joint urban warfare doctrine is a step in the right direction, the doctrine today remains in draft form. It is, arguably, this long-term gap of joint urban doctrine that stymied service efforts to develop coherent and relative MOUT doctrine—especially at the operational level of war.

Not surprisingly, a review of current Army field manuals reveals additional voids in MOUT doctrine. The Army's current capstone manual on MOUT fighting, Field Manual 90-10, *Military Operation on Urban Terrain*, provides one example. Published nearly twenty years ago, the manual now reflects

outdated doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Developed prior to intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) concepts, FM 90-10 also lacks a modern understanding of the intelligence requirements that drive analysis and collection. Like its joint counterpart, the updated version of FM 90-10 remains in draft. Fort Benning's *An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas*, FM 90-10-1, published in 1993, provides a more comprehensive view of intelligence requirements. However, while dedicating fourteen pages to "urban analysis" and an appendix to "urban building analysis," the manual inadequately addresses the importance of intelligence support to information operations, civil affairs, and psychological operations in a MOUT environment.

Like their combat arms companion manuals, Military Intelligence doctrinal publications—many undergoing revisions—also insufficiently address MOUT. Current versions of Field Manuals 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, 34-3, *Intelligence Analysis*, and 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* make almost no reference to intelligence operations in a MOUT environment. You do not find "MOUT" in the table of context, index, or list of acronyms, nor do "related references" mention FM 90-10—save FM 34-130. A fifteen-page scenario provided in FM 34-130 does include a short section where U. S forces operate within a city-like area, although the focus is on noncombatant evacuation vice full-scale urban combat. Distressingly, instead of detailed discussions on the complexities of MOUT, Army intelligence analysis is reduced to "cross-hatching" cities as restrictive terrain to be by-passed wherever possible.

Articles within professional intelligence journals provide another measure of intellectual investment on the subject of MOUT. Yet, a survey of *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)* articles written since 1989 on the subject lists only two titles of significance. The most recent *MIPB* MOUT article indicates "the next revision of FM 34-130 . . . will have a chapter on IPB in MOUT"—a positive indicator of Fort Huachuca's commitment to solve the problem.²⁴ Today, however, tactical intelligence leaders and their analysts preparing for urban combat can find better and more up-to-date information by visiting the U. S. Marine Corps *MOUT* homepage than from our doctrinal publications.

Several factors contribute to our current deficiencies in MOUT doctrine. Until recently, MOUT has had no real institutional champion. Additionally, acquisition of modern systems remains focused on major conflict against symmetrical foes mirroring the former Soviet Union. Perhaps most significantly, our doctrine repeatedly stresses avoiding operations in urban areas. As a result, according to retired military intelligence officer Ralph Peters, "we are not doctrinally, organizationally, or psychologically prepared, nor are we properly trained or equipped, for a serious urban battle, and we must task organize radically even to conduct peacekeeping operations in cities."²⁵ Given these past obstacles, doctrine—especially military intelligence doctrine—requires deep changes to meet the current challenges of urban combat. Therefore, military intelligence, as Peters again explains,

must be profoundly reordered to cope with the demands of urban combat. From mapping to target acquisition, from collection to analysis, and from battle damage assessment to the prediction of the enemy's future intent, intelligence requirements in urban environments are far tougher to meet than they are on the traditional battlefields.²⁶

In summary, against this backdrop of global urbanization trends, changing requirements in a complex urban environment, and the lack of sufficient doctrinal foundation for MOUT, intelligence support to urban warfare emerges as a relevant contemporary topic for warfighters and intelligence professionals alike. What, then, can the Russian experience in Grozny teach us about intelligence support to modern MOUT fighting?

THE BATTLE OF GROZNY

BACKGROUND

The January 1995 battle for Grozny really began more than two centuries before. Russian armies led by the famous commander Alexander Suvorov first made contact with their Chechen cousins during the reign of Catherine the Great. Since that time fear, hatred, and war generally characterize relations between the two peoples.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, Muslim leader Iman Shamil waged a holy war against Russian forces ending with his capture in 1859 and the expulsion of five hundred thousand Chechen's to Turkey. Peace remained elusive as no less than eighteen revolts occurred in the twenty years after Shamil's capture. Following the October 1917 revolution, the Soviet era saw renewed tragedy for the Chechen people. Forced famine brought about by collectivization, and mass arrests, killings, and deportations fueled the hatred. Later, during the "Great Patriotic War," Chechen anti-Soviet guerrillas stepped up attacks against Soviet forces as Hitler's army raced towards the Caucasus. In February 1944, responding to the Chechen "betrayal" to the Motherland, Stalin deported to Central Asia every Chechen in the region—including a one-year old named Dzokhar Dudayev—resulting in great loss of life. Today, Chechens mark the deportations as an official holiday, and Dudayev remains a martyr after his assassination by Russian forces in 1996 while serving as the Chechnya president.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union once again focused Kremlin attention on Chechnya. Two days after the failed August 1991 Russian coup, opposition elements within the Russian Republic of Chechnya launched a revolt of their own. By 6 September the new regime had declared its independence from Russia and asked a former Soviet Air Force General, Dzokhar Dudayev, to serve as president. Three years of negotiations followed in November 1994 by a botched Russian covert operation failed to remove Dudayev from power. By December 1994, mounting political pressure in Moscow demanded swift and decisive action. As the Russian news agency TASS reported, Duma legislators emphasized that "the current situation threatens Russia's vital interests, national security, territorial integrity, social stability, and peace."²⁷ Uninterrupted access to Caspian Sea oil, lawlessness boarding on anarchy, and a belief that Chechnya's secession would encourage similar situations elsewhere spurred Russian President Boris Yeltsin into action. On 11 December, in his third year of power and responding to pressure to stave off further disintegration of Russia, Yeltsin ordered Russian forces into Chechnya beginning a full-scale military intervention to regain control of the rebellious republic. The stage for the battle of Grozny was set.

THE BATTLE OF GROZNY: 11 DECEMBER 1994 TO 31 DECEMBER 1994

On 11 December 1994, based on hasty planning conducted in November 1994 by the North Caucasus Military District commander Lieutenant General Anatoly Kvashnin, army forces launched a three-prong attack into Chechnya from the north, east, and west with the objective of rapidly converging on Grozny. As part of his planning guidance, Kvashnin envisioned a bold attack from the march to quickly seize critical Chechen communication nodes, the Presidential Palace, and the railroad station—all located in the city center. The main effort composed of the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR), the 131st MRB, and the 20th MRR, under Kvashnin's personal direction, would attack from the north. Airborne forces in the east, and a marine regiment, an MRR, and an airborne brigade in the west provided supporting attacks.²⁸ All totaled, Russian forces poised against Grozny numbered close to 38,000 soldiers and special purpose troops backed up by 230 tanks, 454 armored fighting vehicles, and 388 artillery pieces.²⁹

The lead elements of Kvashnin's main effort reached the outskirts of Grozny on 13 December. However, now his initial plan began to unravel. The 15,000 Chechen defenders offered stiffer resistance than expected—and in different ways. After building three concentric defensive rings within Grozny, Dudayev and his military commander, former Soviet artillery colonel Aslan Maskhadov, also prepared defensive positions along the major high speed approaches into the city. Thus, after initially crossing the Chechen border, the Russian western column commanded by Major General Ivan Babichev hit “unexpected opposition from crowds of Ingush civilians, some of them armed, who blocked the road, surrounded Russian vehicles, and destroyed some of them.”³¹

Later, Babichev's forces were again stopped dead in their tracks near a key village astride the approaches to Grozny. Here a crowd of Chechen women performing the dervish prayer ritual *zikr* along the road bluntly told the Russian commander his tanks would have to run them over to proceed. British journalist Anatol Lieven, watching the confrontation along with other news crews, later wrote, “at this point Babichev, with the backing of an assembly of officers, announced in my presence that he would not kill civilians and refused to advance any further.”³²

Russians columns advancing from the east met similar resistance. In fact, while Kvashnin was readying his initial assault on Grozny, his eastern supporting attack had not even crossed the border into Chechnya. Instead,



FIGURE 1, RUSSIAN ARMOR PREPARES TO ADVANCE ON GROZNY³⁰

[i]t was surrounded by crowds of Daghestani Chechens and brought to a halt. At least two armored personnel carriers were taken and reportedly handed over to the Chechens, and the Russian authorities admitted that forty-seven prisoners had been taken. After remaining stationary for a fortnight, it was redeployed north of the River Terek, and joined up with the northern column.³³

Moreover, another report from an ITAR-TASS correspondent riding with Russian forces on 11 December found most rises and bends in roads turned into fortresses, bridges closed off with reinforced concrete blocs, and some bridges, according to local sources, mined. Local inhabitants passed along Russian troop locations and actions via ham radio. Clearly the local population was prepared to take action against any intervening force.³⁴

Meanwhile, General Kvashnin, based on intentionally misleading reports from his western and eastern commanders, continued to press his attack towards Grozny. With his supporting units still 15 to 40 kilometers outside the city, Kvashnin found conventional Chechen firepower totally focused against his main effort. Nearly fifty strongholds supported by minefields and obstacles—each backed up by tanks and infantry fighting vehicles firing from prepared positions—awaited his advance.³⁵ Russian conscripts soon found themselves pitted against tough, experienced, well-organized and equipped, and determined resistance—hardly the “armed bandits” forecast in their intelligence estimates. Thus, by 21 December, after ten days and advancing only 120 kilometers, Kvashnin abandoned his original lightning plan to seize Grozny and began instead to consolidate his forces around the city.

THE BATTLE OF GROZNY: 31 DECEMBER 1994 TO 31 JANUARY 1995

By 25 December Russian troops secured most of the high ground surrounding Grozny from all directions except the south. On 29 December Russian attempts to seize the airfield at Khanvala just inside the eastern portion of the city met stiff resistance from Chechen fighters led by war hero Shamil Basayev. Probing attacks and ground reconnaissance continued until 31 December. Formulating his new plan from a forward command post outside Grozny, Kvashnin once again focused on the rapid seizure of critical nodes in the city's center. According to Kvashnin:

The operational concept at this stage provided for the assault detachments attacking from the northern, western and eastern salients, entering the city and in collaboration with the MVD [Ministry of the Interior] and FCS [Federal Counterintelligence Service] special subunits, seizing the presidential palace, the government, television and radio buildings, the railroad station, and other important establishments in the city center, and blocking the northern part of the city center and the presidential palace from the north.³⁶

Toward this end, Kvashnin assembled four assault elements for the simultaneous attack: Group Sever from the north, Group Zapad from the west, Group Vostok from the east, and a Spetsnaz group. Backed by close air support, artillery, and helicopter gunships, the assault groups orders “were to advance to the center of the city, join forces and destroy all enemy positions.”³⁷ Poorly trained, understrength, and without the benefit of detailed rehearsals, the Russian forces crossed the line of departure on New Years Eve.

The 1st Battalion of the 131st "Maikop" MRB entered Grozny first. Initial reports received at Kvashnin's command post indicated the Russians had surprised their foes. Against little initial resistance, the 131st MRB lead elements and troops from the 81st MRR seized the railroad station. Next, subunits surged to the eleven-story Presidential Palace where they linked up with Group Sever. Here, some vehicle commanders apparently parked their armored vehicles "as if they were in a motor pool," and awaited further instructions.³⁹ Lulled into a false sense of security by the lack of initial contact—and fatigued by their nighttime sojourn—many Russian soldiers simply went to sleep in their vehicles. Long columns stretched from their jump off points through the railroad station all the way into the center of the city. Meanwhile, Groups Vostok and Zapad encountered both stiffening armed resistance and civilian mobs forcing their eventual halt at the city outskirts. For the units inside Grozny, the horrors of urban warfare would soon take hold.




FIGURE 2, THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE BEFORE AND AFTER THE ATTACK³⁸

Unfortunately for the Russians, Dudayev and his able military commander Aslan Maskhadov—both former senior leaders in the Soviet military—correctly anticipated Kvashnin's plan. To defeat the attackers, Dudayev and Maskhadov developed a sound defensive plan of their own. As described above, the Chechen commanders—using facsimile devices, leased satellite frequencies, and cellular telephones—quickly deployed civilian opposition and other military forces outside the city to frustrate initial Russian advances. More importantly, Maskhadov then deployed 15,000 fighters, 60 guns and mortars, 30 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 50 tanks, 100 infantry combat vehicles and 150 antiaircraft systems in three concentric defensive rings around the city itself.⁴⁰

The outer ring located five kilometers from the city center contained strong points astride key approaches especially on the southern and eastern sides. Closer in, Maskhadov built defensive positions near highway entrances, residential areas, bridges, oil fields, and a chemical plant to anchor his middle defensive ring. Finally, the inner defensive ring circled the presidential palace from 1 to 1.5 kilometers away. The Chechen plan depended not only on the determination and individual skills of the *boyeviks*, but on the soundness of their tactics as well.

At the defensive core, the Chechens combined "Stalingrad-like" defenses of the city with what Timothy Thomas calls a "defenseless-defense."⁴¹ More clearly, keenly aware of the effects of overwhelming Russian indirect and direct fire weapon systems, the Chechens refused to place the bulk of their combat power in stationary positions. Instead, they employed mobile "hit and run" and ambush tactics much to their advantage.

Sometimes equipped with one or two civilian vehicles or jeeps, these mobile teams normally contained between five and twenty fighters armed with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), sniper rifles, and automatic weapons. Firing equally effectively from either high-rise apartments or basements, Chechen machineguns sprayed Russian infantry to isolate them from their supporting tanks, while Chechen sharpshooters protected the RPG gunners firing volleys of rockets at approaching armor.

Sebastian Smith, a British journalist, provided this account of the Chechen tactics:

Chechen defensive tactics, simple, but requiring extreme coolness under fire, were concealment, destroying vehicles at close range with RPGs, shooting the crews if they survived, then changing positions, or going into foxholes in time to avoid the inevitable heaving supporting fire called in by the enemy. Mobility was key. Fighters, who knew the neighbourhoods of Grozny back to front, traveled either on foot, or in the tough and inconspicuous Russian-made jeeps and Ladas, which became troop carriers and ambulances.⁴²

Moreover, as Anatol Lieven wrote in *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power*, "the lack of obvious barricades and tank traps made me and other journalists think that the Chechens would put up only a symbolic fight in the city. But . . . they were much better tacticians than that. Barricades would have been blasted to pieces from a distance."⁴³ In short, borrowing a chapter from Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, defensive positions became the *ordinary* force from which the Chechens maintained contact with the Russians and diluted their attacks while the mobile teams acted as the *extraordinary* force delivering the decisive blows. It was these tactics that ultimately defeated Russian forces surrounding the presidential palace on New Years Eve.

Within the city, Chechen fighters near the railroad station and presidential palace soon sprang into action, swarming around long columns of Russian armor stretched throughout Grozny. Small teams of *boyeviks*, intimately familiar with the urban terrain, quickly moved from vehicle to vehicle firing volleys of rocket-propelled grenades at Russian APCs and tanks. Unable either to depress their guns to fire into basements or to elevate them to engage rooftop snipers, tanks became easy targets. Survivors scattered throughout the city, soon to be stalked as prey by Chechen hunters. Surrounded and often unable to communicate with nearby elements, small groups of Russian soldiers fought fierce close-in battles with their Chechen enemy. A Russian BMP gunner, Private Sergeyev, provided this version of the fighting:

On December, 31, they ordered us into our BMPs, and we set off. We did not know where we were going, but the next morning we found ourselves at the railway station in Grozny. . . . Then all hell broke loose. There were 260 of us there. Our commander was killed right away. We lost a lot of officers. We did not know what to do. Our armor was burning. We gathered some wounded and tried to take them out, but the tank transporting them was destroyed, too. I escaped and tried to hide in the basement of a

bakery, but the wall collapsed. . . . I don't know how many Russian soldiers died in that slaughter.⁴⁴

By early morning 1 January 1995 the Presidential Palace remained in Chechen hands and the Russian attack had ground to a halt. Russian losses numbered over 1,000 dead including the commanders of the 131st MRB and 81st MRR, about 3,000 wounded, and over 500 missing. The 131st MRB and 81st MRR suffered the highest loses losing over 80 percent of their armored personnel carriers and 70 percent of their tanks to Chechen fire.⁴⁵ In just twenty-four hours the Russian military had suffered its greatest defeat since World War II.



FIGURE 3, GROZNY, MAIN STREET IN EARLY JANUARY 1995⁴⁶

Unable to claim victory but unwilling to accept defeat, General Kvashnin began rushing reinforcements to his beleaguered elements in Grozny. Units inched their way forward fighting house to house and block to block through the city rubble under the cover of heavy artillery fire and helicopter gunship support. Russian forces finally surrounded the Presidential Palace on 19 January. That same day two bombs dropped by Russian jets penetrated the eleven stories of the presidential palace killing nearly all the defenders in the basement bunker. Under cover of darkness the Chechen survivors abandoned their symbolic holdout, crossing the Sunzha River to continue fighting from new positions. The following day, in a symbolic reenactment of the Red Army seizure of the Reichstag during the Great Patriotic War, Russian troops hoisted the federal flag over the Presidential Palace.⁴⁷ For the media present at least, the Battle for Grozny was over. For the Russian soldiers, however, fighting continued until 26 February when the last Chechen rebels were finally cleared by Interior Ministry troops.

Withdrawing to the mountains, Chechen fighters continued the battle for nearly two years, resorting to terrorist attacks and unconventional warfare against the Russians. In August 1996 the boyeviks recaptured their capital after some of the fiercest fighting of the campaign. By December 1999, the seesaw struggle found the Russian Army provoked into action yet again, encircling the ill-fated city and preparing for yet another assault.

The Russian Army that attacked Grozny in January 1995 was not the same professional, well led, well equipped, and well trained force facing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization during the Cold War. By 1995, low morale reflected by the growing number of desertions, budget tightening brought about by the floundering Russian economy, and the legacy of Afghanistan plagued the Russian Army. Infrequent field training exercises combined with the lack of command post drills above battalion level further degraded military effectiveness. Nonetheless, the Grozny operation provides a useful case study for those interested in better understanding modern urban warfare. Indeed, the battle offers many relevant lessons about the complexities of future city fighting. What, then, can the Grozny experience teach us about intelligence support to MOUT?

THE BATTLE OF GROZNY: INTELLIGENCE LESSONS

Reduced to its simplest terms, Russian mistakes in the analysis of Chechen capabilities and intentions was one major reason for their debacle in Grozny. More to the point, Russian intelligence staffs—and their commanders—failed to adequately *define the urban battlespace environment and describe its effects, and evaluate the Chechen threat*. As such, Russian commanders viewed their operational plan through an intelligence lens distorted not only by the fog of war, but also by the blinding light of their own cultural arrogance, misperceptions, and predilections.

The next section begins by freeze framing several snapshots of the Russian intelligence view taken through two lenses: *the urban battlespace environment lens* and the *threat lens*. The first lens describes the view gleaned through products provided to commanders, the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) process, and the employment of reconnaissance. The second lens focuses on the role of Russian intelligence analysis—especially their misperceptions of critical Order of Battle (OB) factors. In this way we can better interpret the ambiguous collage pasted together by Russian analysts and leaders to draw our own conclusions. The following chart illustrates these points.




TABLE 2, RUSSIAN VIEW OF CHECHEN CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS

THE URBAN BATTLESPACE ENVIRONMENT LENS

Russians commanders attacking Grozny had an unclear view of the urban battlespace lying before them. Three factors contributed to this situation. First, few commanders and leaders had access to detailed and accurate maps or overhead imagery of the city objectives. Second, Russian intelligence preparation of the battlefield failed to provide commanders with an accurate appreciation of the decisive terrain within and around Grozny. The IPB process also overlooked the effects of urban terrain on friendly and enemy courses of action. Finally, poor reconnaissance contributed to an incomplete picture of the threat facing Russian units entering the city.

LACK OF DETAILED AND ACCURATE MAPS AND OVERHEAD IMAGERY

Always considered “close-hold” commodities tightly guarded by Russian military leaders, maps and overhead imagery were in short supply during the planning and execution of operations against Grozny. Despite operating on home territory, Russian intelligence agencies could only provide assault commanders with 1:100,000 scale maps instead of the 1:25,000 or 1:12,500 scale deemed essential for urban missions. “Tactical maps,” according to one observer, “were often made from plain blank paper by hand, with Russian soldiers filling in the sheet with the city vistas (streets, buildings, etc.) in front of them.”⁴⁸ Overhead imagery was in equally short supply. As Russian military expert Lester Grau explains, “essential aerial photographs were not available for planning because Russian satellites had been turned off to save money and few aerial photograph missions were flown. Lower-level troop commanders never received vital aerial photographs.”⁴⁹

After the January 1995 debacle, Russian journalist pressed senior government officials for explanations of these obvious intelligence shortcomings. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev countered charges of incomplete intelligence support by claiming “large scale maps, plans of the city, and photographs of the regions of expected conflict were prepared and provided for every assault detachment and assault group commander . . .”⁵⁰ Likewise, Sergei Stepashin, head of the Russian Counterintelligence Service (FCS), when interviewed about his agency’s map “miscalculations” in Grozny, had this to say: “Maps of the city communications, streets, air raid shelters, and bunkers—all this was provided to the military command by the Counterintelligence Service. The fact that these maps were not passed on in time to the field commanders represents, of course, a tremendous omission.”⁵¹ Yet, first hand reports from journalists who interviewed soldiers and commanders in Grozny contradict the Russian national leadership’s claims. Anatol Lieven’s interview of a young Russian infantryman just hours after the battle provides one example. “The commanders,” reported the soldier, “gave us no maps, no briefing, just told us to follow the BMP in front, but it got lost and ended up following us. By morning, we were completely lost and separated from the other units. I asked our officer where we were, he said he didn’t know—somewhere near the railway station. No, he didn’t have a map either.”⁵²

Unlike the Chechen defenders, Russian troops operated with inadequate knowledge of the city’s sewers, subway and train systems, road networks, and critical infrastructure—and the back streets. Coordinating simple yet vital control measures like unit boundaries, fire coordination lines, objectives, axis of advance, checkpoints, and friendly and enemy locations became exceedingly difficult given the poor resolution of the smaller scale maps. In short, the failure to provide commanders and assault elements with adequate maps and imagery products represented a critical oversight on the part of Russian intelligence agencies.

POOR INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

Besides inadequate maps and imagery products, poor intelligence preparation of the battlespace also obscured the Russian operational view of the Grozny. As described above, General Kvashnin's initial plan was to quickly seize Grozny from the march with attacks from the north, east, and west. After Chechen defenses desynchronized his converging elements, Kvashnin consolidated his forces along the same general axis of attack before delivering the main effort from the north. Like the original plan, this deviation left the southern portion of the city uncovered by Russian forces. Some suggest this was a deliberate omission designed to offer the rebels an escape route when presented with overwhelming Russian power. As one Russian journalist noted, "staff commanders maintain that the southern exit from Grozny is deliberately being held open. They hope that the rebels will leave for the mountainous areas of Chechnya which will become a trap for them."⁵³ However, more plausible evidence indicates insufficient resources, poor planning, and Chechen resistance prevented Russian surveillance and interdiction of key terrain along the city's southern perimeter.⁵⁴ Covering the battle from within Grozny, journalist Sebastian Smith found "no effort as being made [by the Russian forces] to blockade the southern end of the city, the hardest and most strategic end, because it linked up with the rebel-held countryside and villages of southern Chechnya."⁵⁵ Regardless, failure to surround the city throughout the seven-week "siege" had dire consequences for the soldiers fighting within it.

First, Chechen reinforcements and vital supplies flowed regularly into Grozny during the battle. Reliable casualty evacuations through the open corridor sustained Chechen morale. Moreover, when the military situation became hopeless by late February, Chechen fighters escaped through the southern corridor in good order ready to fight again—not necessarily on the terms the Russian soldiers had hoped for.

Perhaps just as importantly, failure to completely seal off Grozny had unforeseen consequences that transcended military aspects of the campaign. In one bewildering story, a Russian mother turned a search for her missing soldier-son into a saga closely followed by the Russian press—much to the chagrin of government leaders. After telegrams to Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament failed to yield results, the mother, Valentina Krayeva, began a search of her own. Travelling from her hometown of Volgodonsk, Krayeva slipped through Russian lines only to find her way to Dudayev's headquarters on 17 January. Here, braving nearly four thousand Russian artillery rounds per hour, she pleaded with Dudayev and his chief military commander Shamil Basayev for her son's release. Glad to comply, the Chechen leaders quickly turned the episode into a propaganda windfall. While covering the story, authors Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Wall reported:

Krayeva was soon followed by dozens more soldiers' mothers looking for their sons who had fallen prisoner to the Chechens. Encountering indifference and helplessness from the Russian military, they ended up searching for their sons themselves. They were in an extraordinary situation, travelling behind Russian lines, under fire from their own armed forces, dependent on the assistance and hospitality of the Chechens who were suppose to be their enemy. They became a fixture at the gates of the Russian bases and at the

doors of the Chechen leadership. Some lived in Chechnya for over a year, searching all over the republic for news about their sons.⁵⁶

Still other IPB-related shortcoming degraded overall Russian performance in Grozny. For example, Russian intelligence officers and analysts overlooked urban terrain effects on tactical frequency modulated (FM) communications. Relying on FM radios to issue orders, Russian leaders soon found themselves unable to contact friendly units. Command and control, as well as situational awareness, became a nightmare. Commanders also neglected the effects of Chechen defenders firing from basements and high-rise apartments. Templatting probable Chechen defense position along avenues of approach into Grozny—and sharing this analysis on updated large-scale maps and overhead imagery—would have helped leaders select proper support by fire positions for BMP armored fighting vehicles and ZSU mobile anti-aircraft artillery. These vehicles, with main gun elevations of +74 and +85 degrees respectively, could have suppressed Chechen positions in the high-rise buildings better than the ineffective T-72 and T-80 tanks.⁵⁷ However, as Lester Grau maintains, the “planners failed to take elementary precautions or to forecast how the Chechens might defend the city. As Russian columns moved to Grozny, they were surprised by snipers, road blocks and other signs of Chechen determination to defend the city.”⁵⁸

Russian intelligence preparation of the battlespace, then, presented commanders with an incomplete understanding of the urban battlespace effects. Describing these deficiencies, Russian military expert Timothy Thomas argues “the Russians did not do a proper intelligence preparation of the battlefield—indeed, there does not seem to be an established procedure for processing data for the intelligence preparation of the battlefield in the Russian armed forces. Commanders and troops tried to overcome this shortcoming in the course of combat actions, leading to delays in operations and reduced effectiveness.”⁵⁹ Thus, together with insufficient maps and imagery support, the IPB process shrouded Russian views of Chechen capabilities and intentions. These miscalculations, combined with poor reconnaissance and intelligence analysis, complicated Russian operations in and around Grozny throughout the battle.

POOR RECONNAISSANCE

Russian reconnaissance activities at both the strategic-operational level and tactical level failed to support commanders with timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence during operations in Grozny. At the strategic-operational level, the Russian Counterintelligence Service (FCS)—not unlike its American counterparts—lacked sufficient human intelligence resources to uncover Dудаев’s true capabilities and intentions. Although the FCS initially dispatched a general officer and twenty *Vympel* counter-terrorist soldiers to Grozny to collect intelligence, FCS director Sergei Stepashin later admitted, “understandably, 20 people were unable to do anything serious.”⁶⁰

Moreover, special purpose *Spetsnaz* units—ideally suited for reconnaissance missions—were apparently underutilized or overlooked by conventional commanders. For example, after interviewing senior Defense Ministry officials about the need for “special troops” in Grozny, Russian journalist Vladimir Kartashkov gleaned “there is no need whatsoever to carry out reconnaissance during combat operations against an irregular army.”⁶¹ Perhaps more telling was Kartashkov’s conclusion that “for all the seeming multitude of special-purpose subunits, the Defense Ministry does not have a single military unit trained to carry out combat operations in urban areas against a well-armed enemy. Nor do other power structures have such units.”⁶² Anecdotal evidence supports Kartashkov’s view. In at least one case, a platoon-sized group of “elite” paratroopers inserted along the southern approaches to Grozny on New Year’s Eve quickly ran into trouble. After just two days in the woods, the unit ran out of food and requested resupply. In response, higher headquarters dropped in twenty-five more paratroopers—but no rations. Journalists Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal continue the story:

The situation was growing serious when the paras ran into two Chechen hunters in the woods with their shotguns, and took them prisoner. When the hunters failed to return home, Zelimkhan Amadov, a karate expert and professional athlete, formed a search party of thirty-seven villagers, mostly armed with hunting rifles. They came upon the Russians on the third day and a firefight broke out. After about twenty minutes they heard someone shouting. ‘It was one of the hunters, his elder brother was with us and recognized his voice,’ Amadov recounted a few days after the incident. ‘He came to us and said they wanted to talk.’

The Chechens suggested the Russians surrender and three officers came out, agreed, and laid down their weapons. They sealed the agreement with a much-needed cigarette. Two Russians had been killed in the shooting and two more were wounded. The Chechens marched the Russians down the hill. ‘For two days they had eaten nothing. When we gave them food they fell upon it like dogs,’ Amadov recalled.⁶³

Their mission compromised, the elite Russian prisoners were however allowed to telephone their mothers “to come and fetch them home.”⁶⁴

Russian tactical air and ground reconnaissance operations attained similar results. Poor weather conditions, smoke and haze from burning oil refineries, and the ever-present threat of Chechen small arms fire kept air reconnaissance assets from accurately finding enemy positions in Grozny. To minimize risky air reconnaissance missions Russian commanders deliberately avoided using those assets until late in the operation. By 5 January, realizing that the value added outweighed the risks, the Russian Air Force stepped up air reconnaissance—albeit with meager resources amounting to “several planes and helicopters.”⁶⁵ Yet, despite air superiority, Russian air reconnaissance added little to the overall picture of Chechen defensive dispositions.

Ground reconnaissance elements were equally hard pressed to provide assault units with accurate information. Normally a mainstay of Russian military planning, ground reconnaissance efforts in Grozny often occurred too late and with insufficient focus. Poor communications and inadequate maps further hampered reporting. More disquieting was the lack of aggressiveness displayed by typical reconnaissance elements. Instead of dismounting and searching for the enemy, scouts “did not dare step

outside the protection of their armoured vehicle[s] for snipers lurked everywhere, but they saw at every turn of the street what would happen to them if caught by the Chechens.”⁶⁶

Even debriefs of truck drivers—often a source of valuable information—yielded little intelligence. One driver returning from a nighttime Grozny mission offered this explanation: “It was essential not to stop, because they said if you ever stopped anyone could fire on you, from a grenade-launcher or a sniper, so if I stopped I would be a dead man. And there was no way to avoid them, because if they saw a Russian they came running for you.”⁶⁷ In short, as authors Stasys Knezy and Romanas Sedlickas conclude in their book *The War in Chechnya*, “Reconnaissance was done only according to the rule ‘What I see, I report,’ though the purpose of intelligence is to gather and report sufficient information to ensure that the opponent’s actions will not come as a surprise.”⁶⁸ Lacking information normally provided by strong reconnaissance efforts, Russian assault elements all too often blindly encountered Chechen defenders who possessed a better view of the urban battlespace.

In summary, insufficient mapping and imagery products, inadequate IPB processes, and poor reconnaissance deeply distorted General Kvashnin’s view of Grozny throughout the campaign. Shrouded behind these failures, the actual intentions and capabilities of the Chechen threat remained hidden from Russian Army commanders.

THE THREAT LENS

Evaluation of order of battle factors provides a basis to analyze the Russian assessment of Chechen capabilities and intentions during the 1995 Grozny operation. As delineated in FM 34-3, *Intelligence Analysis*, many factors contribute to the overall OB analysis.⁶⁹ Analyzed together, these factors help intelligence analysts and commanders develop accurate threat models “to piece together information, identify information gaps, speculate and predict, and do problem solving. Most importantly, the threat model allows some of the risk in a given situation to be quantified.” For the purposes of this discussion, we will focus on five key OB factors: strength estimates, composition, disposition, tactics, and combat effectiveness.

STRENGTH ESTIMATES

Russian planners estimated the Chechen force in Grozny at about five to seven thousand fighters. In fact, the Chechen opposition numbered closer to 15,000 on the eve of the battle—nearly double the Russian estimate.⁷⁰ Poor reconnaissance and limited human intelligence sources in the city contributed to these inaccurate estimates. Chechen reinforcements flowing into Grozny’s unsecure southern corridor also made timely and accurate strength computation more perplexing. The Russian High Command’s underestimation of available reinforcements contributed further to the problem. As a 1996 Russian Duma committee charted to investigate the causes of the war concluded: “The military operation had been planned without considering the fact that on [Dudayev’s] side stood a regular and well-armed army of up to fifty thousand people.”⁷¹



FIGURE 4, BOYEVICKS MOVE THROUGH GROZNY (NOTE RPG-7 IN CENTER)⁷²

However, the FCS's method of estimating Chechen strength—upheld by senior Defense Ministry officials—represents the most grievous error in the order of battle strength equation. Indeed, according to Carlotta Gall, “the [FCS's] information was undoubtedly fatally flawed since its main source was the self-serving anti-Dudayev opposition. Grachev was a fool to trust it.”⁷³ The anti-Dudayev opposition forces collaborating with covert Russian forces several months before the assault often underestimated Chechen rebel capabilities when reporting to the Kremlin. Using these reports as a primary basis for their planning, Russian commanders, as Timothy Thomas notes, failed to achieve “the 6:1 force ratio desired for attacking a city (a doctrinal norm derived from combat experience in World War II). . . . On the contrary, the correlation of forces was 1:2.5 against Russian forces at the start of combat.”⁷⁴ [Original emphasis.]

COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION

Besides miscalculating Chechen strength, Russian intelligence services also misjudged the enemy's composition and disposition. Even when initial contacts and assaults on critical facilities suggested otherwise, lower-level staffs still pictured Chechen composition as “armed bandits” and criminal factions acting independent of clear command and control. Instead, Chechen leaders often maneuvered highly mobile elements numbering up to twenty fighters—more akin to platoon-sized elements by Russian standards—composed of cohesive, disciplined warriors with tremendous fighting experience.

Additionally, analysts overlooked larger battalion-sized formations such as the “Abkhaz” Battalion formed from veterans of the Chechen National Guard. These battle-hardened and well-organized soldiers played decisive roles throughout the battle. Kremlin intelligence services from the Defense, Internal Affairs, and Internal Security Ministries each disregarded still other Chechen units forming for the battle despite their acknowledgement in press reports. According to one author, these forces included:

- ✓ Volunteers arriving from Dagestan and other areas of the Caucasus on 2 December;
- ✓ Local villagers forming their own battalions on 2 December;
- ✓ Mercenaries from the North Caucasus republics, the Baltic States, Ukraine, and Afghan Mujahedin arriving from Azerbaijan on 5 December;
- ✓ 300 fighters from the former Russian Republic of Georgia’s arriving in Chechnya on 22 December;
- ✓ A suicide regiment and the formation of a “women’s” battalion on 7 December.⁷⁵

In short, actual Chechen composition remained a mystery unsolved by Russian intelligence staffs—from national to tactical level—until late in the battle.

Accurate portrayal of Chechen dispositions represents another miscalculated order of battle factor. As you recall, General Kvashnin’s forces met unexpected stiff resistance along their approaches toward Grozny. Once breached or bypassed, frequent encounters with other unlocated enemy forces led to further delays and losses. Yet, failure to identify the Chechen deployment in three concentric defensive rings around the city proved the major blunder of Kvashnin’s analysis of enemy dispositions. As Timothy Thomas again explains,

The Russian leadership did not do a good job of preparing the ‘theater’ for warfare One general, choosing anonymity, noted that after liberating several city districts, Russian forces realized that Dudayev had created numerous firing points, communication nets and underground command points which made the job much more difficult. In this respect, the main military intelligence (GRU) and the federal counterintelligence services (FSK) did poor jobs of providing information on the illegal formations that the Russian forces faced, compounding the fate of the untrained soldiers.⁷⁶

Not surprisingly, Kvashnin’s failure to uncover Chechen dispositions short-circuited his ability to deduce Dudayev’s intentions. Soldier debriefs and journalist reports pasted together after the battle disclose a much stronger and more integrated threat arrayed against the Russian forces than perceived beforehand. A more complete view of Chechen unit locations would have signaled to the Russians not only Chechen intentions to fight a protracted battle, but their determination and sophistication as well. Arguably, foreknowledge of Chechen dispositions would have motivated Kvashnin to modify either his assault plan or task organization allowing him to better leverage advantages in Russian firepower against gaps or weak points in the defenses. Unfortunately, by stumbling repeatedly into hidden enemy strong points, widely dispersed Russian forces became diluted and then hopelessly bogged down.

TACTICS

Tactics or the manner in which units conduct operations was another OB factor overlooked by the Russian commanders. Given their predilections about Chechen strength, composition, and disposition, it is not difficult to understand why Russian commanders also dismissed the “bandits” tactics as irrelevant. Nonetheless, as described above, Chechen fighting methods proved very effective against Kvashnin’s forces. One such tactic adopted by the Chechens was “hugging” Russian units. By interlocking with their foes, the Chechens negated Russian advantages in indirect and aerial firepower. Indeed, few Russian officers requested indirect fire at such risky distances. More motivated than their Russian counterparts, the *boyeviks* often gained the upper hand in the ensuing man-to-man battle.

Dudayev’s design of a “defenseless defense” demonstrated another effective urban warfare tactic.⁷⁷ The Chechens realized early in the battle that superior Russian firepower made positional warfare a definite disadvantage. Thus, rather than using strong points as the main method of defence, the Chechens employed mobile hit and run forces to conduct ambushes against their foe. *Mayak* Radio reporter Vladimir Pasko summarized these tactics during a 3 January 1995 broadcast. “The commander of the federal troops has reported certain tactics being used by the fighters: small detachments using vehicles mounted with large-caliber machine guns, grenade launchers and light weapons appear in areas where Russian servicemen are located, fire at their positions, and withdraw among the housing blocks.”⁷⁸

Sometimes these mobile forces would simply harass Russian soldiers and convoys by firing several volleys and then quickly disengaging. In such cases, the Russians responded typically with massive artillery barrages that needlessly destroyed Grozny’s infrastructure but seldom accomplished the aim of killing the provocateurs. Other times the Chechens executed well-orchestrated three-tiered ambushes simultaneously from basements, ground floors and roofs of high-rise structures. Hunter-killer teams equipped with RPGs, working closely with deadly snipers, attacked their targets with great effect. The destruction of the 131st “Maikop” MRB at the Presidential Palace on New Year’s Eve exemplified these tactics. Here, General Kvashnin’s decision to commit predominantly armored forces into the heart of Grozny demonstrated a complete misunderstanding of the tactics employed by his foes. In fact, “no one in the Russian military command” writes Stasys Knezys “had dared to imagine that Chechen fighters would forgo traditional tactics or that tank and armored columns would lose their efficacy and be lit on fire from close range under battle conditions where they could not maneuver.”⁷⁹

In sum, Russian intelligence analysts failed to provide their commanders with an accurate analysis of Chechen strength, composition, disposition, and tactics prior to the Battle of Grozny. An after action report written by a high ranking Russian general staff officer involved in the planning—and subsequently leaked to the Russian press on 25 January 1995—admitted as much. According to the report’s author, “The enemy’s situation, composition, and the probable character of its actions were not analyzed.”⁸⁰ Yet, Russian analysis failed in at least one more critical OB factor: judging the *combat effectiveness* of the Chechen forces.

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

Combat effectiveness, according the FM 34-3, describes the abilities and fighting quality of a unit. Analyzing factors such as morale, belief in a cause, and the national characteristics and will of the people helps analysts deduce an enemy's effectiveness and predict their capabilities and intentions. Yet Kvashnin's attack into Grozny shows no evidence of factoring these intangibles into his planning. Like the other OB factors, Russian intelligence analysts and commanders viewed Chechen combat effectiveness through a lens distorted by overconfidence, biases, and preconceptions.

Overconfidence permeated the Russian military staffs from the Defense Ministry down to tactical units. Defense Minister Grachev boasted on more than one occasion that a single paratroop regiment could defeat the Chechen criminal elements.⁸¹ According to authors Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, "it was a mixture of personal inexperience and racial arrogance that made Grachev overconfident."⁸² At lower levels, a young Russian officer offered this view to western journalists just prior to the attack: "We need a new Stalin who would show us how to deal with these dark-skinned types."⁸³ Lulled into a false sense of security by their own propaganda machines, few Russian commanders really understood the fighting abilities of their opponents. It was not until two weeks into the heavy fighting that a senior Kremlin official, Deputy Defense Minister General Georgy Kondratyev, finally admitted, "It's not just the gangs which are fighting in Chechnya. It's the Chechen people. The men have taken up arms. They are fighting for their homes and for their land and for the graves of their forefathers."⁸⁴

The Russians also misunderstood Chechen nationalism and their deep-seated hatred of Moscow rule. Fiercely independent, Chechen culture was steeped in both long traditions of nationalism and martial spirit. "Their God is freedom, their law is war" wrote Russian poet Mikhail Lermontov in 1832. Indeed, "the bulk of the *boyeviks*," writes author Sebastian Smith, "were inspired not by politics but by their national mythology of the warrior and defense of freedom. They might be Dudayev supporters, but they might also despise him and his team's robbery of Chechnya. 'Protecting my home', more often than not, was what a fighter answered if asked why he'd taken up arms."⁸⁵ Certainly Russian callousness fanned the flames of Chechen nationalism. For example, in 1949 the Red Army in Grozny erected a statue of General Alexi Yermolov whom in 1816 "launched a scorched earth policy . . . treating the Chechens with extreme cruelty."⁸⁶ The inscription on the statue read: "There is no people under the sun more vile and deceitful than this one." Chechens attacked the statue repeatedly in the 1970s and 1980s.

The Stalin-era deportations further fueled Chechen nationalism. While some Russian nationalities remain indifferent to the suffering spawned by deportations, the Chechens only grew to hate the Russians more. Indeed, as one author explains, "Joseph Stalin earned the further enmity of the Chechen people by deporting the entire population to Central Asia in 1944. Many died during these deportations, which Chechens viewed as genocide."⁸⁷ Furthermore, regarding the deportations, Russian author Alexander Solzhenitsyn remarked:

Only one nation refused to submit to the psychology of submission . . . the Chechens. The strange thing was that everybody feared them and no one prevented them from living as they liked. The authorities who had owned the country for 30 years could not force them to respect their laws . . . No Chechen ever tried to be of service or to please the authorities. Their attitude towards them was proud and hostile.⁸⁸

Ironically, the 1995 Russian Army commanders overlooked Chechen military service in the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War. Chechen soldiers received no less than fifty-six Hero of the Soviet Union medals during the war—a disproportionately large share of medals given their relatively small population at the time and the fact that many Chechens hid their true identities from the communists. Moreover, as one author observes, “even today, few Russians are aware that more than 300 of the men who perished during the suicidal defence of the fortress in Brest, Belarus, a battle of almost legendary symbolism in Soviet patriotic lore, were Chechens and Ingush.”⁸⁹ Just as importantly, contemporary Russian soldiers disregarded the fact that many of the rebels had recently filled their ranks—departing with valuable insights into the way the Russian Army thinks and fights. Combining Chechen history with their current fighting experience, Russian analysts should have deduced the real warrior traits of the Chechen people. Unfortunately, weeks of terrible city fighting ensued before the Russian soldier would uncover the true capabilities of the *boyeviks* defending Grozny.

To review, Russian intelligence services failed to provide their commanders a clear view of the urban battlespace. Lack of sufficient maps and imagery products, poor reconnaissance, and improper IPB procedures shrouded the threat residing in Grozny. Poor analysis of enemy OB factors—most importantly Chechen tactics and combat cohesiveness—further obscured the Russian commanders’ view of true rebel capabilities and intentions. General Kvashnin’s *coup d’oeil*—his ability to see the situation in “the twinkling of an eye”—remained distorted throughout the battle.

The distorted view of Chechen capabilities and intentions led to serious flaws in the Russian plan. Rather than factoring the effects of modern urban warfare into their equation, Russian planners instead focused on their traditional “correlation of forces” paradigm. That paradigm failed to adequately gauge the response of the Chechen people, their deep hatred of Russia, or the fighting spirit of the *boyeviks*. By overlooking these factors and totally disregarding the complexities of the urban environment, Russian planners embraced techniques derived from Soviet urban warfare tactics traced to the Cold War. As Russian Army expert Lester Grau maintains,

Soviet urban tactics . . . were designed to complement large-scale, high tempo offensive operations in foreign countries. These tactics called for capturing *undefended* enemy cities from the march and bypassing *defended* cities. The doctrine assumed the enemy to be foreign professional soldiers who prefer declaring an open city instead of seeing it reduced to rubble. The situation in Chechnya, however, didn’t fit these Soviet assumptions about urban combat.⁹⁰ [Original Emphasis.]

Senior Russian Defense Ministry official Lieutenant General Leonid Isashov reinforces this view. Speaking to a reporter just five days after the 131st MRB defeat in Grozny, Isashov declared, “the troops, the command, and the staffs were trained for classic combat operations, they were not taught to fight on

their own territory against their own people.”⁹¹ In short, flawed intelligence analysis contributed greatly to the battle plan formed by Russian commanders. As a senior officer from the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment attacking into Grozny alongside the 131st MRB observed, “If the fools in the FSK had given us any idea of the kind of the kind of [sic] resistance we were going to meet, of course we wouldn’t have driven into the town like that.”⁹² Deputy Defense Minister Gromov more succinctly quipped that the Chechnya campaign was “being handled by idiots.”⁹³



FIGURE 5, RUSSIAN BMP AND DESTROYED TRUCK IN GROZNY⁹⁴

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO MOUT

This paper began by discussing the relevance of intelligence support to commanders in MOUT. Using the Battle of Grozny as a case study, we analyzed Russian operations to draw lessons learned germane to the topic. What, then, can we learn from this modern urban battle to apply to our own doctrine, organizations, and materiel?

DOCTRINE IMPLICATIONS

“Doctrine,” as defined in Army Field Manual 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, encompasses the “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their action in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”⁹⁵ A strong doctrinal foundation provides commanders with an operational framework for tactics, techniques and procedures. Just as importantly, doctrine guides commanders toward accomplishing national interests. A 1999 RAND report authored by Russell W. Glenn underscores the importance of doctrine for our armed forces. In the report Glenn writes:

Doctrine serves national interests. It does so not only by providing commanders guidance on how to conduct operational activities, itself an extremely important function, but also by acting to guide technological development, the design and conduct of training, and the design of organizations. . . . Without doctrine to provide a beacon, these activities can occur in a haphazard, inefficient, uncoordinated, and possibly ineffective ways. Training in particular relies on doctrine for uniform standards and consistency of method in the organizations for which doctrine was written. Lacking this guidance, CINCs will receive units that have incomplete approaches to MOUT.⁹⁶

Given the complexity of urban warfare, commanders need sound doctrine for intelligence support to MOUT. As discussed above, current Army intelligence doctrine inadequately addresses the full range of requirements in a modern MOUT environment. Three recommended improvements for intelligence doctrine appear below.

First, future capstone intelligence manuals—especially FM 34-130—require a more rigorous and systematic methodology for MOUT IPB. For example, defining the urban battlespace environment should include more than just general urban descriptions or building and street patterns. These factors, albeit important, too often receive the priority of initial analysis leaving critical nodes or “decisive points” within the urban area overlooked or disregarded. Indeed, as Glenn again argues in *“We Band of Brothers:” The Call for Joint Urban Operations Doctrine*:

Cities have additional nodes that may qualify as centers of gravity or decisive points. Power generation plants, police stations, and water-distribution facilities, for example, have an operational significance often not found in other environments. Early identification of what elements qualify for such status and subsequent determination of their location and other relevant information is essential to proper operational planning.⁹⁷

As evidenced during the Russian campaign in Grozny, the Presidential Palace or other government facility, while symbolic, may not be the key to controlling the city or the enemy. Enemy lines of communications flowing through urban areas—both physically and electronically—require special attention. Detailed analysis must include synthesizing fragmented and disparate OB factors into a meaningful whole focusing on the “so what” or second and third order effects of controlling urban critical nodes. Just as important, identifying these critical nodes allows intelligence operators to focus limited collection capabilities on priority requirements.

Second, doctrine must address the specific types of intelligence products necessary to support commanders during urban operations and the ways to disseminate those products to users. Given the isolated and compartmented nature of the urban warfare environment, leaders down to squad level require special consideration for timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence products. Today, paper maps provide leaders one vital method to visualize the terrain, plan operations, navigate through cities, and record situational awareness. As such, detailed up-to-date mapping products with a scale of no greater than 1:25,000 remain essential especially in Third World cities. Since urban sprawl, enemy preparations, and the effects of collateral damage from military operations can quickly change the urban geography, leaders will require current overhead imagery to supplement mapping products. Linking real time

thermal, infrared, or electrical-optical imagery feeds from unmanned aerial and ground vehicles to manpackable receivers offers one possible solution.

Finally, urban IPB doctrine must include a more deliberate and sophisticated analytical approach to evaluating the threat and determining its courses of action. The complexity of urban warfare requires a greater focus on the way we think about the enemy and his environment. “The analytical demands inherent in planning and monitoring MOUT activities,” according to Russell Glenn, “are extraordinary in their diversity and scope. Current discussions of IPB fail to more than touch on this area. Far more rigorous guidance is essential if joint planners and commanders are to be properly served.”⁹⁸

Toward this end, analysis at lower levels needs to transcend the purely traditional—albeit indispensable—tactical IPB considerations and address the more profound effects of the opponents’ will, combat cohesiveness, and cultural characteristics. Combining a clear view of the terrain with knowledge of OB factors such as strength, composition, disposition, and tactics provides the foundation for analyzing enemy capabilities. However, only by grasping fully the fighting spirit and political will of an adversary can we hope to discern his real intentions. Timothy Thomas’s commentary on Russian operations in Chechnya reinforces this point:

Any force considering an attack in an urban environment must evaluate both the type of opponent it is attacking (guerrillas, regular force, etc.) and its will. If the opposing force has deep and persistent antipathy towards the attackers, then it will be impossible to achieve victory without a decisive confrontation and military conquest. The local force has the advantage; if it can persevere, it can pick the attacker apart in both the short and long term, eventually wearing him out. In this sense, the moral-psychological orientation of the defenders adds an important element beyond mere weaponry to the “correlation of forces.”⁹⁹

As we explored above, Russian soldiers in Grozny paid a heavy price for miscalculations and oversights of the *boyeviks*’ combat cohesiveness by intelligence analysts.

Besides emphasis on the opponents’ combat cohesiveness and cultural characteristics as the dominant MOUT OB factor, future Army intelligence doctrine should address additional analytical considerations germane to modern MOUT. These areas might include:

- ✓ Intelligence support to MOUT Information Operations: special emphasis on denying enemy use of information systems and computer operations, identifying cultural vulnerabilities and ways to exploit them, and understanding the threat environment to support friendly COAs
- ✓ Intelligence support to civil affairs operations: locating and caring for noncombatants to minimize casualties, understanding their concerns and needs, tapping them for intelligence
- ✓ Less preoccupation with “Soviet-style” organization and tactics: prioritize and build data bases that include Third World and irregular force threats based on current CINC Operations Plans; avoid “mirror imaging;” incorporate real world threats like the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Columbia* (FARC), Hezbollah in Beirut, or tribal factions in Mogadishu into Warfighter and joint exercises
- ✓ More attention to Third World city characteristics vice European urban operations
- ✓ Templating noncombatants and Nongovernment Organizations to minimize collateral losses

- ✓ Understanding enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures for negating US strengths and advantages: improve analysis of asymmetric threats to US and coalition forces

ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The doctrinal recommendations offered above provide a foundation upon which to construct an enhanced military intelligence organizational framework geared toward MOUT. Given a renewed emphasis on analysis germane to MOUT, several organizational improvements appear necessary. The first recommendation centers on creating a national-level Joint MOUT Analysis Center (JMAC).¹⁰⁰ The major functions of this organization would include the collection, fine-grained analysis, and dissemination of “city intelligence” focused on “hot spots” prioritized by the regional CINCs. The JMAC would also maintain a MOUT relational database geared towards CINC urban area requirements. At a minimum, in line with a 1994 Defense Science Board MOUT study, this database should include:

- ✓ Biographic Intelligence: identities and locations of principals responsible for functional sectors such as communications, public infrastructure, transportation, utilities, and government
- ✓ Engineering and Cartographic Intelligence: Technical information on major city infrastructure such as sea water ports, airfields, railroad, power grids, mass transit, bridges, military sites, embassies or consulates, medical facilities, sports stadiums, communication centers, jails, and high-rise structures
- ✓ Institutional Services: Registry of hospitals, fire and police stations, churches, and schools
- ✓ Demographic and Sociological: Maps and profiles of socioeconomic information such as descriptions of gangs and clans
- ✓ Cultural and Anthropological: Profiles of DOs and DON'Ts for operating within an urban area
- ✓ Attitudinal: Views of the local population regarding U.S. and coalition forces¹⁰¹

The JMAC, not unlike other functional standing task forces responsible for counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or counter-drug operations, would leverage national intelligence collection capabilities to support operational requirements of CINCs and their operational forces. To fulfil these tasks, the JMAC should be assigned to the National Ground Intelligence Center under the operational control of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Operating within a virtual, collaborative, distributive environment, the JMAC would share real time analysis and assessments with supported CINCS, other national-level agencies such as the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, and Commerce, and academic and commercial centers. Reserve Component military intelligence organizations can also play a vital role, especially those citizen-soldiers that play key roles in city planning and civil engineering. Linking these elements together creates an unprecedented degree of synergism and provides supported commanders with a common picture of the threat and the operating environment. Recall the Russian General Staff's difficulty merging intelligence reports from tactical, operational, and national-level intelligence agencies prior to and during the Battle for Grozny. A JMAC-type organization would work to mitigate those shortcomings.

Organizational fixes at the tactical and operational levels involve more moderate solutions. For example, assigning Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) to the division and corps Analysis and Control Elements (ACE) would greatly assist senior intelligence officers planning and conducting operations in urban environments. Units deploying to areas outside the regional expertise of their assigned FAOs could be quickly augmented by FAOs from other divisions and corps. Arguably, these officers—already familiar with tactical intelligence requirements and standard operating procedures—would be more adept at providing commanders with expert advice.

Reconnaissance and scout organizations specifically tailored for urban warfare would provide additional advantages for combat arms battalion and brigade commanders. Given current resource constraints, it is unlikely that new units will be added to our force structure. As such, Training and Doctrine Command, working with the Infantry, Armor, and Military Intelligence proponents at Fort Benning, Fort Knox, and Fort Huachuca, should consider creating specially trained and equipped urban reconnaissance teams from within existing infantry and armor battalion or divisional cavalry squadron force structure. Designating several of the Long Range Reconnaissance Detachment teams already assigned to the light infantry divisions and the corps military intelligence brigades as urban reconnaissance teams offers another possible alternative.

Finally, forming urban analysis and collection teams within Intelligence and Security Command's (INSCOM) echelon above corps theater support and force projection brigades such as the 513th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade provides one mechanism to focus intelligence support on army component commander urban warfare requirements. These teams, embedded in the theater MI brigade's ACE and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Battalion, could leverage both brigade and national-level collection capabilities to fulfill army or land component commander priority intelligence requirements. High demand, high cost, "one-of-a-kind" SIGINT and Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) collection systems—difficult to sustain within each divisional MI battalion—should remain with force projection MI brigades. The brigade could attach these systems and teams to supported Army tactical units based on mission requirements. Assigning liaison officers from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to the MI brigade ACE would add a powerful dimension to theater-level urban warfare analytical capability.

MATERIEL IMPLICATIONS

The functions and forms discussed above demand renewed emphasis on materiel solutions to improve intelligence support to urban warfare. Two specific materiel areas need immediate attention. The first centers on the tactical commander's capabilities to gather intelligence. The second involves ways to improve the commander's view of the urban battlespace.

MOUT provides many challenges for intelligence collection. Camouflage and concealment provided by high-rise buildings, sprawling urban growth, or subsurface transportation or sewer systems often shroud enemy dispositions from the ever-present eyes of U.S. overhead reconnaissance platforms. Line of sight problems also degrade SIGINT operations designed to intercept, exploit, and locate enemy

communications assets. Further, as one urban warfare expert maintains, "U.S. military technology, designed for large-scale war in open areas of central Europe or the desert, is not well suited for urban operations."¹⁰² Indeed, tactical MI battalions today possess no organic capability to collect against cellular telephone communications devices like those effectively used by Chechen fighters in Grozny.

Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) offer one solution to fill the tactical commander's current intelligence collection void while conducting MOUT. For example, the "Urban Robot" UGV recently designed by Massachusetts-based IS Robotics demonstrates many essential features for effective urban reconnaissance. Lightweight, easily transportable by one soldier, and sturdy enough to be "hand tossed" over a six-foot high fence or dropped through a man-hole cover, Urban Robot uses forward articulated tracked flippers to negotiate stairs, climb curbs or stand upright to navigate through narrow twisting passageways. Its low profile makes detection and disabling by gunfire difficult and also reduces the likelihood of providing cover to the enemy. A single operator uses a handheld computer to maneuver the UGV while head-mounted or handheld devices display information potentially collected from a variety of infrared, thermal, Electro-optic or acoustic sensors.¹⁰³

While not a panacea to MOUT intelligence collection requirements, UGVs like Urban Robot offer one innovative solution to improve situational awareness for tactical units and help commanders better understand their environment. Apparently, senior Department of Defense officials agree: the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Tactical Mobile Robotics program remains funded at \$50 million from 1998 to 2002.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, Lieutenant General Paul Kern, director for the Army Acquisition Corps, addressed the potential of UGVs at an October 1999 Association of the U.S. Army annual meeting.¹⁰⁵ The U. S. Marine Corps continues developmental work at the Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory at Quantico. Although hesitant to immediately commit funds for non-development item acquisition, the Army continues to conduct UGV Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations based on an approved operational requirements document. By 1st Quarter Fiscal Year 2000, the Army has made no decisions to field UGVs.

Besides improved collection capabilities, tactical commanders need improved tools to help them visualize the urban battlespace require. While accurate, small-scale mapping products remain indispensable, current technologies offer tremendous advantages especially during pre-deployment planning and mission rehearsal. A recent U. S. Army Topographic Engineering Center (TEC) initiative known as the Urban Tactical Planner (UTP) provides one example. Resident on a compact disk, the UTP uses Windows 95, Windows NT and UNIX platforms to exploit Digitized Terrain Elevation Data, commercial imagery and other map and imagery products. The lightweight system allows commanders to zoom onto multiple perspectives of MOUT targets in both two- and three-dimensional views. Other initiatives by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency such as the Mission Planning and Rehearsal Tool appear equally promising. Yet, the keys to success for all future Army battlespace visualization tools center on assuring adequate communications bandwidth and reducing equipment size to maintain a small footprint within the deployment area.

CONCLUSION

Timely, reliable, accurate, and relevant intelligence support to commanders remains a prerequisite for conducting successful MOUT. The trend toward global urbanization, new operating challenges brought about by this changing environment, and shortcoming in our current intelligence doctrine, materiel, and organizations provide important reasons to study the topic. Russian operations during the 1994-95 battle for Grozny offer a useful case study on intelligence support to MOUT.

As you recall, Russian intelligence staffs—and their commanders—failed to adequately *define the urban battlespace environment and describe its effects, and evaluate the Chechen threat*. Insufficient maps and imagery products, inadequate IPB processes, and poor reconnaissance shrouded Chechen capabilities. Faulty analysis of Chechen OB factors—most importantly the *boyeviks' combat cohesiveness*—prevented Russian commanders from truly gauging the enemy's intentions. As such, Russian commanders viewed their operational plan through an intelligence lens distorted not only by the fog of war but also by the blinding light of their own cultural arrogance, misperceptions, and predilections.

Nearly five years after the 131st MRB's slaughter in Grozny, Russian forces remain locked in a costly struggle for the city with no end in sight. Careful attention to the doctrinal, organizational, and materiel aspects of intelligence support to MOUT provide three important ways to prevent similar misfortunes for American forces.

WORD COUNT = 14,005

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⁷⁴ Thomas, "The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat," 89.

⁷⁵ Thomas, *The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: (Parts One and Two of a Three Part Study. Actions from 11-31 December 1994)*, 30.

⁷⁶ Thomas, *The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: The Battle for Grozny, 1-26 January 1995 (Part I)*, 412-413.

⁷⁷ Thomas, "The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat," 95.

⁷⁸ Vladimir Pasko, *Mayak Radio*, 3 January 1995, as reported in FBIS-SOV-95-001, 3 January 1995, p. 24.

⁷⁹ Knezys, *The War in Chechnya*, 68.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 82.

⁸¹ Ibid., 50, and Thomas, *The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: (Parts One and Two of a Three Part Study. Actions from 11-31 December 1994)*, 34.

⁸² Gall, *Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus*, 202.

⁸³ Thomas, *The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: (Parts One and Two of a Three Part Study. Actions from 11-31 December 1994)*, 26.

⁸⁴ Smith, *Allah's Mountains: Politics and War in the Russian Caucasus*, 161-162.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 153.

⁸⁶ Thomas, "The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat," 90.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Smith, *Allah's Mountains: Politics and War in the Russian Caucasus*, 121.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 63.

⁹⁰ Grau, "Russian Urban Tactics: Lessons from the Battle for Grozny," 1.

⁹¹ Livia Klingl, "Idiots Are Responsible for the Organization," *Vienna Kurier*, 5 January 1995, p. 5, as reported in FBIS-SOV-95-003, 5 January 1995, 10.

⁹² Lieven, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power*, 110.

⁹³ Klingl, "Idiots Are Responsible for the Organization," 10.

⁹⁴ Photograph by Eddy van Wessel, available from <<http://fotograaf.com/wessel/gr04.htm>>; Internet; accessed 21 December 1999.

⁹⁵ U. S. Department of the Army, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, Field Manual 101-1-5 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of the Army, 20 September 1997), 1-55.

⁹⁶ Glenn, "We Band of Brothers:" *The Call for Joint Urban Operations Doctrine*, 17.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 30.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 28.

⁹⁹ Thomas, "The Battle for Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat," 91.

¹⁰⁰ For another view of a potential national-level MOUT urban analysis center, see Captain Charles N. Black, "An Urban Analysis Center For the 21st Century," 5 August 1999, available from <<http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/uac.html>>; Internet; accessed 30 Oct 1999.

¹⁰¹ Office of the Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 1994 Summer Study on Military Operations in Built Up Areas (MOBA)* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Defense, November 1994), 51-52.

¹⁰² Rosenau, "Every Room is a New Battle: The Lessons of Modern Urban Warfare," 385.

¹⁰³ John A. Hadam, Sales Manager, IS Robotics, to LTC Brian A. Keller, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 21 December 1999, letter in the hand of LTC Brian A. Keller; additional information on "Urban Robot" is available at <www_isr.com>.

¹⁰⁴ George I. Seffers, "U.S. Military: Unmanned Ground Vehicles Need Humans," *Defense News* 14 (1 November 1999): 6; also available from <<http://www.defensenews.com>>.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

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